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Are “fair” wages quantitatively important for 
business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria? 
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Abstract: We introduce ”fair” wages in a general-equilibrium model where worker’s 
effort is unobservable and investigate whether such a mechanism can quantitatively 
account for the degree of real wage rigidity in the Bulgarian labor markets, as docu-
mented in Lozev, Vladova, and Paskaleva (2011) and Paskaleva (2016). In contrast to 
Danthine and Kurmann (2004), we internalize the effect that past wages have on the 
current effort level. We calibrate the model to Bulgarian data (1999-2016), and quantify 
the effect of technological shocks on hours and wages in the theoretical setup. Overall, 
the calibrated model with ”fair” wages performs poorly when it comes to the relative 
volatilities of labor market variables. This is because aggregate labor market conditions, 
as proxied by the employment rate and past aggregate wages, turn out not to be quanti-
tatively important for business cycles in Bulgaria. 
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Introduction and Motivation 
In this paper, we investigate the quantitative importance of unobservable worker’s ef-
fort, and the downward-rigid efficiency (”fair”) wages that are introduced as a result of 
that informational imperfection, in explaining business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria 
after the introduction of the currency board arrangement in 1997. Earlier macroeconom-
ic literature, using Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models with per-
fectly-competitive labor markets, e.g., Vasilev (2009), was not able to capture well the 
dynamics exhibited by labor market variables (wages, employment, and unemployment) 
in Bulgaria. That is why we adapt the standard model, and augment it with a plausible 
mechanism in labor markets that deviates from spot wage contracting, and instead move 
to setups that emphasize the long-term aspects of the labor arrangement. After all, the 
employer-employee relationship is a multi-period contract problem. Therefore, an alter-
native mechanism of wage contracting is considered here, as those mechanisms, mostly 
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based on non-Walrasian settings, are promising areas of research, as pointed in Vasilev 
(2017c). Similarly, including a government sector, in addition to making the model 
more realistic, helps the standard Real-Business-Cycle model match data better. 
As shown in Paskaleva (2016), real wages in Bulgaria are indeed downward rigid. That 
is mostly due to collective agreements in place, which prohibit cuts in base wages. Such 
restrictions mean that adjusting labor costs needs to happen mostly through employment 
reductions. Lozev, Vladova, and Paskaleva (2011) also document downward real wage 
rigidity in Bulgaria, even though it is lower than in the other EU member states. We use 
these empirical findings to motivate our modelling approach here. In contrast to Vasilev 
(2017b) who introduces wages of no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and 
Vasilev (2017c), who incorporated reciprocity arrangement in labor relations and wage 
determination a la ”gift exchange” as in Akerloff (1982), into a relatively standard RBC 
model with government sector, here we follow Danthine and Kurmann (2004). As in 
Vasilev (2017b,c), effort will be modelled as a productive input in the firm’s production 
function, but it will be unobservable from the employer’s perspective, and thus a con-
tract fully specifying the required level of effort can be neither specified nor enforced. 
The novelty in this paper is that conditional on working, each household suffers addi-
tional dis-utility from exerting effort on the job. However, they will be willing to supply 
an effort level beyond and above some norm if they feel they have been treated in a fair 
manner by their employer. The extra effort would come as reciprocation for a wage rate 
wt above some reference level. In addition, the effort function depends on the overall 
labor market conditions, the going wage, and past compensation. Allowing effort to 
depend on past wages helps to introduce sluggishness in wage adjustments in the theo-
retical framework, and that is what the standard gift exchange model, e.g., Akerlof 
(1982) lacks. 
In addition, Collard and de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004) show 
that including past wage considerations in the reference wage function helps a general-
equilibrium macroeconomic model generate substantial downward wage rigidity and 
improves the overalll statistical fit. In contrast to Danthine and Kurmann (2010), here 
we stay within the RBC paradigm, and instead of estimating the model, we calibrate it 
to Bulgarian data for the period 1999-2016, which corresponds to the period of stability 
after the introduction of the currency board arrangement. In addition, for better realism, 
we introduce a detailed government sector and analyze the business cycle properties of 
the model relative to the data in much more detail as compared to earlier studies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
described the data used and the calibration procedure. Section 4 presents the long-run 
theoreticall properties of the model. Section 5 simulates the model and evaluates its 
business cycle properties vis-a-vis data in the spirit of Canova (2007), especially the 
response of main variables to an unanticipated technology shock. Section 6 concludes. 
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Model Setup 
Description of the model 
There is a continuum of identical one-member households distributed on the [0, 1] in-
terval and indexed by i. Each household i derives utility out of consumption and leisure. 
As in Vasilev (2018), each household i maximizes the following utility function: 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡{𝑙𝑛 𝑐𝑡
𝑖 − ℎ𝑡
𝑖 𝐺(𝑒𝑡
𝑖)}
∞
𝑡=0
 (2.1)  
Where 𝐸0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information available to house-
hold i at time 0, 0 < 𝛽 < 1 denotes the common to all households discount factor, 𝑐𝑡
𝑖 is 
the consumption of household i in period t, ℎ𝑡
𝑖  is the fraction of time available to house-
hold i that is spent working, and 𝑒𝑡
𝑖 is the level of effort exerted. The total time endow-
ment available to each household is normalized to unity, and 𝑙𝑡 = 1 − ℎ𝑡 is implicitly 
expressed as time off work. 
The novelty in this relatively standard utility function is the last term. In particular, as in 
Vasilev (2018), conditional on working, each household suffers additional dis-utility 
from exerting effort on the job. However, they will be willing to supply an effort level 
beyond and above some norm if they feel they have been treated in a fair manner by 
their employer. The extra effort would come as reciprocation for a wage wt above some 
reference level. In addition, the effort function depends on the overall labor market 
conditions, the going wage, and past compensation – all those factors are empirically 
supported in surveys, e.g., Bewley (1998). 
Following Collard and de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2007), we ex-
press the effort function as 
𝐺(𝑒𝑡
𝑖) = [𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − (𝜙0 + 𝜙1 ln 𝑤𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜙2 ln 𝑛𝑡 + 𝜙3 ln 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜙4 ln 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑖 )]2 (2.2)  
Where 𝜙0,𝜙1 > 0, 𝜙2, 𝜙3, 𝜙4 < 0, 𝜙1 + 𝜙3 > 0, 𝑤𝑡
𝑖  is the household’s wage in period t, 
and 𝑤𝑡denotes the average wage in the economy. 
As in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) household i’s labor supply is assumed to be 
indivisible. In equilibrium, as demonstrated in Vasilev (2018), only a fraction nt would 
be selected to work a full shift in each period t. In order to Pareto-improve the consump-
tion bundle received by both workers and non-workers, a lottery market can be included 
to provide insurance against unemployment (i.e., not being selected for work) in a cer-
tain period. Such an arrangement would achieve full insurance (efficient risk sharing), 
so everyone would receive the same consumption independent of the employment sta-
tus. If we assume that all households pool their resources together and maximize aggre-
gate welfare, the resulting discounted utility function becomes as in Danthine and Kur-
mann (2004): 
∑ 𝛽𝑡{ln 𝑐𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝐺(𝑒𝑡)}
∞
𝑡=0
 (2.3)  
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Each household starts with 𝑘0
𝑖 = 𝑘0 initial capital, which is equal to the aggregate capi-
tal in period 0. The aggregate capital stock then evolves as follows: 
𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 (2.4)  
where 0 < 𝛿 < 1 denotes the depreciation rate on capital, and 𝑖𝑡 is investment in period 
t. The before-tax rental rate on capital is 𝑟𝑡, and in addition the households have a legal 
claim on all the firm’s profit 𝜋𝑡. 
In addition to labor income, households receive labor income as well. The hourly wage 
rate in the economy is 𝑤𝑡 , so the total before-tax labor income generated in each period 
is 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡. The aggregate household’s budget constraint is then 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏
𝑦)[𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡] + 𝑔𝑡
𝑡 (2.5)  
where 𝜏𝑐 is the consumption tax rate, 𝜏𝑦is the common income tax rate, and 𝑔𝑡
𝑡 are the 
aggregate government transfers. The problem now is to maximize (2.3) s.t. (2.5). The 
first-order optimality conditions are as follows: 
𝑐𝑡 : 
1
𝑐𝑡
= Λ𝑡(1 + 𝜏
𝑐) (2.6)  
𝑒𝑡: 𝑒𝑡 = 𝜙0 + (𝜙1 + 𝜙3) ln 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜙2 ln 𝑛𝑡 + 𝜙4 ln 𝑤𝑡−1 (2.7)  
𝑘𝑡+1: Λ𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡Λ𝑡+1[1 − 𝛿 + (1 − 𝜏
𝑦)𝑟𝑡+1] (2.8)  
𝑇𝑉𝐶: 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞𝛽
𝑡Λ𝑡𝑘𝑡+1 = 0 (2.9)  
where Λt is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the household’s budget constraint in 
period t. The first optimality condition equates the marginal utility of consumption to 
the marginal utility of wealth. The second condition is called the Effort Condition (EC), 
or Solow (1979) condition. (Note that we have imposed the fact that in this economy 
everyone is identical, so the individual and the average wages are the same.) In other 
words, the optimal effort level depends on the changes in current and past wage rate, 
and current employment. The third condition is the employment optimality condition. 
The fourth is the so called Euler equation, which describes the optimal allocation of 
capital in any two congruent periods. The last condition, the Transversality condition 
(TVC), is a boundary condition that needs to be imposed to eliminate explosive solu-
tions. 
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Firm 
There is a stand-in firm that produces a homogeneous final good that can be used for 
consumption, investment, or government purchases. The Cobb-Douglas production 
function uses physical capital and efficiency labor as inputs an is as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑘𝑡
1−𝛼(𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑡)
𝛼 (2.10)  
where 𝐴𝑡  captures the level of technology, 0 < 𝛼, 1 − 𝛼 < 1 are the efficiency labor 
and capital shares, respectively. 
The firm maximizes profit subject to the household’s participation condition and effort 
conditionn being satisfied, which turns the firm’s problem becomes dynamic. More 
specifically, this is because the wage set today influences effort next period through the 
existence of past wage, wt−1 as an argument in the effort condition. The firm discounts 
profit by the stochastic discount factor (expressed in utility terms) Λ𝑡 = 1/[(1 + 𝜏
𝑐)𝑐𝑡], 
hence the firm’s dynamic problem is as follows: 
max ∑ 𝛽𝑡Λ𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
{𝑦𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑡} (2.11)  
The resulting first-order conditions are 
𝑘𝑡:  (1 − 𝛼)
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
= 𝑟𝑡 (2.12)  
𝑛𝑡:  𝛼
𝑦𝑡
𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛼
𝑦𝑡
𝑒𝑡
𝜕𝑒𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝑡
=𝑤𝑡    (2.13)  
𝑤𝑡:  𝛼
𝑦𝑡
𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛽
Λ𝑡+1
Λ𝑡
𝛼
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒𝑡+1
𝜕𝑒𝑡+1
𝜕𝑤𝑡
   (2.14)  
where (2.13) and (2.14) make use of the fact that effort responds to the current and past 
wage rates. The first condition describes optimal renting of capital: in equilibriumm it 
receives its marginal product. The second condition characterizes labor demand by the 
firm: in this setup, there is an elasticity term, (
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑛
)(
𝑛
𝑒
) ≥ 0, which appears to capture the 
effect of a new margin of adjustment. More specifically, a higher level of employment, 
though costly in terms of labor productivity, may actually increase the value of the 
firm’s investment and in turn worker’s effort; Using an analogy from finance, from the 
firm’s point of view, the worker is a multi-period asset. In other words, given the dy-
namic implications of the wage on the effort level exerted, the firm is hiring more peo-
ple as compared to the perfectly competitive, perfect effort observability case. 
The last equation describes how efficiency wages are set, i.e., how the firm chooses a 
wage rate to inspire the worker to supply optimum effort. Combining the optimality 
condition for employment and wages produces as in Vasilev (2017c): 
1 = 𝜖(𝑒𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡) − 𝜖(𝑒𝑡 , 𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽𝐸𝑡[
Λ𝑡+1
Λ𝑡
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑦𝑡
𝜖(𝑒𝑡+1, 𝑤𝑡)] (2.15)  
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Where 𝜖(𝑒𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡) denotes the elasticity of effort level with respect to the wage rate, and 
𝜖(𝑒𝑡+1, 𝑤𝑡) denotes the elasticity of the next-period effort level with respect to the cur-
rent wage. With 𝜖(et, wt) > 0, the standard Solow (1979) condition does not apply, since 
an increase in the wage rate at the margin produces an extra increase in worker’s 
productivity; similarly, with c(et+1, wt) < 0, the firm has to take into consideration the 
futuree effect of the current wage rate - that a higher wage paid today makes it more 
costly to extract higher effort from a worker in the future. 
Given the assumed functional form, we can now solve for the optimal effort level to 
obtain 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝜙1 + 𝜙3 − 𝜙2 + 𝛽𝜙4 = ?̅? > 0 (2.16)  
That effort is positive and constant over the cycle. Next, plugging that expression into 
the effort function yields 
ln 𝑤𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ln 𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾2 ln 𝑤𝑡−1  (2.17)  
where 
𝛾0 =
𝜙1 + 𝜙3 − 𝜙2 + 𝛽𝜙4 − 𝜙0
𝜙1 + 𝜙3
, 𝛾1 = −
𝜙2
𝜙1 + 𝜙3
, 𝛾2 = −
𝜙4
𝜙1 + 𝜙3
 (2.18)  
which differs from Danthine and Kurmann (2004); Here we are following Danthine and 
Kurmann (2010), and internalize the effect that past wages have on current effort level, 
which is the more realistic case. 
Government 
The government will be assumed to be running a balanced budget in every period. The 
government collects revenue from levying taxes on capital, labor, and profit income, 
and then spends on government consumption and transfers, which are returned lump-
sum to the households: 
𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑡 + 𝜏
𝑦[𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡] = 𝑔𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑔𝑡
𝑡 (2.19)  
Where 𝑔𝑡
𝑐 are (non-productive) government purchases. Government spending share will 
be set equal to its long-run average so that the level will be varying with output. Gov-
ernment transfers will be residually determined and will always adjust to make sure that 
the government budget is balanced. 
Stochastic Processes for the exogenous variables 
The first exogenous stochastic variable is total factor productivity At, which is assumed 
to follow AR(1) processes in logs, in particular 
ln 𝐴𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜌𝑎) ln 𝐴0 + 𝜌𝑎 ln 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑎  (2.20)  
where 𝐴 = 𝐴𝑜 > 0 is the steady-state level of total factor productivity process, 0 < ρa < 
1 is the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑎 ~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎2) are ran-
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dom shocks to the total factor productivity process. Hence, the innovations to technolo-
gy represent unexpected changes in the total factor productivity process. 
Decentralized Dynamic Equilibrium with fair wages 
Given the process followed by total factor productivity {𝐴𝑡}𝑡=0
∞ , the tax rates {𝜏𝑐, 𝜏𝑦}, 
initial capital stock 𝑘0, hours worked per household ℎ
𝑖 , the decentralized dynamic equi-
librium with fair wages is a list of sequences {𝑐𝑡 , 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡}𝑡=0
∞  for each household i, input 
levels {𝑘𝑡 , 𝑛𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡}𝑡=0
∞  chosen by the firm, a sequence of government spending categories 
{𝑔𝑡
𝑐 , 𝑔𝑡
𝑡}𝑡=0
∞  and input prices {𝑤𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡}𝑡=0
∞  such that (i) each household i maximizes its 
utility function subject to its budget constraint; (ii) the representative firm maximizes 
profit by offering a wage schedule that satisfies the workers’ incentive compatibility 
constraint and to induce an optimal effort level; (iii) government budget is balanced in 
each period; (iv) all markets clear. 
Data and model calibration 
To characterize business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria, we will focus on the period 
following the introduction of the currency board (1999-2016). Quarterly data on output, 
consumption, and investment was collected from the National Statistical Institute 
(2017), while the real interestt rate is taken from Bulgarian National Bank Statistical 
Database (2017). The calibration strategy described in this section follows a long-
established tradition in modern macroeconomicss: first, as in Vasilev (2016), the value 
of the discount factor, β = 0.982, is set to match the steady-state capital-to-output ratio 
in Bulgaria, k/y = 13.964, in the steady-state Euler equation. The labor share parameter, 
α = 0.571, is obtained as in Vasilev (2017d), and equals the average value of labor in-
come in aggregate output over the period 1999-2016. This value is slightly higher as 
compared to other studies on developed economies, due to the overaccumulation of 
physical capital, which was part of the ideology of the totalitarian regime, which was in 
place until 1989. Next, the average income tax rate was set to τy = 0.1. This is the aver-
age effective tax rate on income between 1999-2007 when Bulgaria used progressive 
income taxation, and equal to the proportional income tax rate introduced as of 2008. 
Similarly, the tax rate on consumption is set to its value over the period, τc = 0.2. This is 
in line with the estimates for Bulgaria (Vasilev 2017a) as well over the period studied. 
Next, the steady-state depreciation rate of physical capital in Bulgaria, δ = 0.013, was 
taken from Vasilev (2016). It was estimated as the average quarterly depreciation rate 
over the period 1999-2014. Next, the steady state employment rate in Bulgaria is set to 
n = 0.533, as in Vasilev (2016a). Following Vasilev (2017c), the values for γ1 and γ2 
were estimated from the optimized effort function. Finally, the processes followed by 
total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated from the detrended series by running an 
AR(1) regression and saving the residuals. Table 1 below summarizes the values of all 
model parameters used in the paper. 
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Table 1. Model Parameters 
Param Value Description Method 
β 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated 
α 0.571 Labor Share Data avg. 
δ 0.013 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data avg. 
n 0.533 Employment rate Data avg 
γ1 0.140 Weight on labor market conditions Estimated 
γ2 0.814 Weight attached to past wage  Estimated 
τy 0.100 Average tax rate on income Data avg. 
τc 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data avg. 
ρa 0.701 AR(1) persistence coefficient, TFP Estimated 
σa 0.044 st. error, TFP process Estimated 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Steady-State 
Once the values of model parameters were obtained, the steady-state equilibrium system 
solved, the ”big ratios” can be compared to their averages in Bulgarian data. The results 
are reported in Table 2 on the next page. The steady-state level of output was normal-
ized to unity (hence the level of technology A differs from unity), which greatly simpli-
fied the computations, and allows the steady-state to be solved by hand. Next, the model 
matches consumption-to-output ratio by construction; The investment and government 
purchases ratios are also closely approximated. The shares of income are also identical 
to those in data, which follows directly from the constant-returns to scale featured by 
the aggregate production function.  The after-tax return, where r˜ = (1 − τy) − δ is also 
relatively well- captured by the model. 
Table 2. Data Averages and Long-run Solution 
Variable Description Data Model 
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000 
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.648 0.674 
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175 
k/y Capital-to-output ratio 13.96 13.96 
gc/y Government consumption-to-output ratio 0.151 0.151 
wh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571 
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429 
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333 
rb      After-tax net return on capital/bond rate 0.014 0.016 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Out of steady-state model dynamics 
Since the model does not have an analytical solution for the equilibrium behavior of 
variables outside their steady-state values, we need to solve the model numerically. This 
is done by log-linearizing the original equilibrium (non-linear) system of equations 
around the steady-statee. This transformation produces a first-order system of stochastic 
difference equations. First, we study the dynamic behavior of model variables to an 
isolated shock to the total factor productivity process, and then we fully simulate the 
model to compare how the second moments of the model perform when compared 
against their empirical counterparts. 
Impulse Response Analysis 
This subsection documents the impulse responses of model variables to a 1% surprise 
innovation to technology. The impulse response functions (IRFs) are presented in Fig. 1 
on the next page. As a result of the one-time unexpected positive shock to total factor 
productivity, output increases upon impact. This expands the availability of resources in 
the economy, so use of output - consumption, investment, and government consumption 
also increase con- contemporaneously. 
At the same time, the increase in productivity increases the after-tax return on the two 
factors of production, labor, and capital. The representative households then respond to 
the incentives contained in prices and start accumulating capital, and supplies more 
hours worked. In turn, the increase in capital input feeds back in output through the 
production function, and that further adds to the positive effect of the technology shock. 
In the labor market, the wage rate increases, and the household increases its hours 
worked. In turn, the increase in total hours further increases output, again indirectly. 
Over time, as capital is being accumulated, its after-tax marginal product starts to de-
creasee, which lowers the households’ incentives to save. As a result, the physical capi-
tal stock eventually returns to its steady-state and exhibits a hump-shaped dynamics 
over its transitionn path. The rest of the model variables return to their old steady-states 
in a monotone fashion as the effect of the one-time surprise innovation in technology 
dies out. 
Simulation and moment matching  
As in Vasilev (2017b), we will now simulate the model 10,000 times for the length of 
the data horizon. Both empirical and model simulated data is detrended using the Ho-
drick-Prescott (1980) filter. Table 3 on the next page summarizes the second moments 
of data (relative volatilities to output, and contemporaneous correlations with output) 
versus the same moments computed from the model-simulated data at a quarterly fre-
quency. To minimize the sampling error, the simulated moments are averaged out over 
the computer-generated draws. As in Vasilev (2016, 2017b, 2017c), the model matches 
quite well the absolute volatility of output. By construction, government consumption in 
the model varies as much as output. The model overestimates the variability in con-
sumption, and less so, the predicted volatility of the investment. Still, the model is quali-
tatively consistent with the stylized fact that consumption generally varies less than 
output, while investment is more volatile than output. 
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses to a 1% surprise innovation in technology 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
With respect to the labor market variables, the variability of employment, unemploy-
ment, and wages predicted by the model is too low than that in data. This is a confirma-
tion that the incentive wage function, when calibrated to Bulgarian data, does not de-
scribe very well the dynamics of labor market variables after the introduction of the 
currency board. Next, in terms of contemporaneous correlations, the model systemati-
cally over-predicts the procyclicalityy of the main aggregate variables - investment, and 
government consumption. This, however, is a common limitation of this class of mod-
els. With respect to wages, the model predicts strong cyclicality, while wages in data are 
acyclical. This shortcoming is well-known in the literature and an artifact of the wage 
following closely labor productivity in the model. In the next subsection, as in Vasilev 
(2016), we investigate the dynamic correlation between labor market variables at differ-
ent leads and lags, thus evaluating how well the model matches the phase dynamics 
among variables. In addition, the autocorrelation functions (ACFs) of empirical data, 
obtained from an unrestricted VAR(1) are put under scrutiny and compared and con-
trasted to the simulated counterparts generated from the model. 
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Table 3. Business Cycle Moments 
 Data Model 
σy 0.05 0.05 
σc/σy 0.55 0.90 
σi/σy 1.77 1.92 
σg/σy 1.21 1.00 
σh/σy 0.63 0.37 
σw/σy 0.83 0.14 
σy/h/σy 0.86 0.14 
σu/σy 3.22 0.37 
corr(c, y) 0.85 0.93 
corr(i, y) 0.61 0.80 
corr(g, y) 0.31 1.00 
corr(h, y) 0.49 0.93 
corr(w, y) -0.01 0.96 
corr(u, y) -0.47 -0.82 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Auto- and cross-correlations 
This subsection discusses the auto-(ACFs) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs) of the 
major model variables. The coefficients' empirical ACFs and CCFs at different leads 
and lags are presented in Table 4 below against the averaged simulated AFCs and 
CCFs. Following Canova (2007), this is used as a goodness-of-fit measure. 
Table 4: Autocorrelations for Bulgarian data and the model economy 
 k  
Method Statistic 0 1 2 3 
Data corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.765 0.552 0.553 
Model corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.954 0.898 0.833 
 (s.e.) (0.000) (0.028) (0.055) (0.080) 
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Data corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.484 0.009 0.352 
Model corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.954 0.898 0.833 
 (s.e.) (0.000) (0.028) (0.055) (0.080) 
Data corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.810 0.663 0.479 
Model corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.957 0.906 0.847 
 (s.e.) (0.000) (0.027) (0.051) (0.075) 
Data corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.702 0.449 0.277 
Model corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.956 0.903 0.840 
 (s.e.) (0.000) (0.027) (0.053) (0.077) 
Data corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.971 0.952 0.913 
Model corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.958 0.909 0.853 
 (s.e.) (0.000) (0.026) (0.049) (0.072) 
Data corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.810 0.722 0.594 
Model corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.953 0.894 0.825 
 (s.e.) (0.000) (0.029) (0.056) (0.082) 
Data corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.760 0.783 0.554 
Model corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.958 0.906 0.846 
 (s.e.) (0.000) (0.027) (0.051) (0.075) 
Source: Author’s calculation 
As seen from Table 4 above, the model compares relatively well vis-a-vis data. Empiri-
cal ACFs for output and investment are slightly outside the confidence band predicted 
by the model, while the ACFs for total factor productivity and household consumption 
are well- approximated by the model. The persistence of labor market variables is also 
relatively well-described by the model dynamics. Overall, the model with habits in 
consumption generatess too much persistence in output and both employment and un-
employment, and is subject to the criticism in Nelson and Plosser (1992), Cogley and 
Nason (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996b), who argue that the RBC class of 
models do not have a strong internal propagation mechanism besides the strong persis-
tence in the TFP process. In those modelss, e.g., Vasilev (2009), and in the current one, 
labor market is modelled in the Walrasian market-clearing spirit, and output and unem-
ployment persistence are low. 
Volume 20, Issue 1, 2020 
103 
Next, as seen from Table 5 below, over the business cycle, in data labor productivity 
leads employment. The model, however, cannot account for this fact, despite the de-
pendence of the wage function on its lagged value. As in the standard RBC model a 
technology shock can be regarded as a factor shifting the labor demand curve, while 
holding the labor supply curve constant. Therefore, the effect between employment and 
labor productivity is only a contemporaneous one. 
Table 5. Dynamic correlations for Bulgarian data and the model economy 
 k  
Method Statistic -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Data corr(nt, (y/n)t−k) -0.342 -0.363 -0.187 -0.144 0.475 0.470 0.346 
Model corr(nt, (y/n)t−k) 0.081 0.104 0.133 0.819 0.288 0.183 0.106 
 (s.e.) (0.314) (0.273) (0.227) (0.149) (0.240) (0.272) (0.303) 
Data corr(nt, wt−k) 0.355 0.452 0.447 0.328 -0.040 -0.390 -0.57 
Model corr(nt, wt−k) 0.081 0.104 0.133 0.819 0.288 0.183 0.106 
 (s.e.) (0.314) (0.273) (0.227) (0.149) (0.240) (0.272) (0.303) 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the quantitative importance of ”fair” wages in explaining 
fluctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. In contrast to Vasilev (2017b) who introduces 
wages of no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and Vasilev (2017c), who 
incorporated reciprocity arrangement in labor relations and wage determination a la 
”gift exchange” as in Akerloff (1982), into a relatively standard RBC model with gov-
ernment sector, here we follow Danthine and Kurmann (2004, 2010). We calibrated the 
model to Bulgarian data after the introduction of the currency board arrangement and 
studied the impulse responses of aggregate variables in the face of exogenous techno-
logical shocks. Overall, the calibrated model with ”fair” wages performs poorly when it 
comes to the relative volatilities of labor market variables. This is because aggregate 
labor market conditions, as proxied by the employmentt rate in the economy, turn out to 
be of lesser importance. As suggested in Vasilev (2017c), rent-sharing aspects, and 
firms’ ability to pay, are the most important determinants of wages in Bulgaria over the 
period 1999-2015. Similar findings have been documented in Lozev, Vladova and 
Paskaleva (2011) and Paskaleva (2016). 
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